Abstract. This work briefly (An extended version can be found at https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/63502) examines some of the most relevant Bitcoin Laundry Services, commonly known as tumblers or mixers, and studies their main features to try to answer some fundamental questions including their security, popularity, transaction volume, and generated revenue. Our research aims to inform both legitimate users and Law Enforcement about the characteristics and limitations of these services.
Introduction to Tumblers
Bitcoin offers pseudo-anonymity [10] because all transactions are visible and traceable, but no names are stored in the Blockchain. Bitcoin laundry services are open, like most modern technologies, to dual use. They are employed by regular users who do not engage in any illicit activities and simply want to improve on the anonymity features of Bitcoin. On the other hand, they can also be used by cyber criminals for laundering their ill-gotten gains before exchanging them into traditional currencies such as Dollars, Euros or Sterling. It is also common for stolen Bitcoins (i.e. after a wallet compromise or a hack) and for ransom money to be processed by one or more tumblers to reduce its traceability. In either scenario, Bitcoin laundry services play a central role in the Bitcoin economy, but they have been relatively poorly studied [8, 9, 11] , and their operation is not that well understood. We will try to address this in this work, by focusing on a small number of very well-known Bitcoin tumblers that vary widely in their characteristics and sophistication.
Methodology. For this purpose, multiple transactions have been carried out involving the mixers under study, transactions that have been later carefully studied for finding patterns, regularities and correlations with a set of tools we have developed. Using our own tools, and together with other commercially available ones 1 , it becomes possible to demonstrate that these services suffer from serious limitations that expose their users to traceability and, sometimes, even de-anonymisation attacks.
Attacker Model. The attacker model we will consider in this paper is based around the concept of taint analysis. The objective of taint analysis is to link multiple Bitcoin addresses. Typically at least one is known to contain stolen Bitcoins, or Bitcoins that are otherwise clearly linked with a criminal activity, so establishing this link will show the latter addresses (ones that have received funds from it) are tainted and, for example, money from them should not be accepted by reputable merchants or at legitimate exchanges. To break this link or taint cyber-criminals use mixers, so our aim at attacking a mixer is first and foremost to be able to characterize all (or a sizable proportion) of the Bitcoins that have gone through it. Of course, this taint can also be interpreted in terms of anonymity levels, when tainted addresses and wallets can be linked back to individuals. Apart from this, we will try to find how exactly these mixers work and establish clusters or other patterns between input and output addresses so that, to a certain extent, we can 'reverse' the operation of a tumbler and, at least probabilistically, trace back and deanonymise it.
Results
We present in the following our most relevant results in terms of security and privacy characteristics of the mixers we have studied.
DarkLaunder, Bitlaunder and CoinMixer
Darklaunder, Bitlaunder and CoinMixer are probably the weakest mixers of all tested in this work. We analyse these jointly because we have reasons to believe they share a common owner and are almost identical in their functioning and features. So, albeit in the following we will mostly refer to Darklaunder many of our findings also apply to Bitlaunder and CoinMixer, which will be explicitly mentioned only to highlight any differences. Darklaunder is available on both the clearnet 2 where it makes usage of CloudFlare (a widely used proxy service) and on the darknet 3 . This duality is uncommon in good mixers, as is the use of CloudFlare.
The service offers two types of laundering: the quick one is claimed to take between one and six hours to process, and has a 2% fixed fee. The secure one is said to be dealt with by hand and to be more secure. In this case there is a 3% fixed fee. For both, the lowest accepted sum is 0.01 BTC 4 . According to the service's FAQ, there is an upper limit of 1,000 BTC. To be able to use the service, registration is mandatory and a username, name, password and email address have to be provided. This is common in other mixers, but not a good practice regarding privacy. To launder Bitcoin, the user has to make a deposit on a given address. When withdrawing, the only choices are the amount of Bitcoin to withdraw and the destination address. Despite their claim that it does not keep any personal information, we have found it stores data about their user's previous transactions with the service, including their exact date and time and the involved IPs and Bitcoin addresses. All these weaknesses could be also found in Bitlaunder. Since there is precedent of authorities arresting owners of laundering services 5 , and the service retains full historical transaction data, this mixer can not be considered secure. In addition, PHP errors creep around frequently during its usage.
Security Analysis. On top of its bad design, the service is also subject to other critical problems. First, it is possible to find the IP address of the server hosting the mixer. This makes easy to establish a link to an individual's name and address, and to other mixers he owns and operates. Since the server is using CloudFlare, which is only an HTTP proxy, the emails sent by the service (in response to customer's questions) do not go through it. By analyzing the header of these emails it is possible to find that the mail server is located at the address mail.darklaunder.com, which points to the IP address 94.23.45.166. We can, therefore, access the website directly now without going through CloudFlare. Furthermore, the SSL certificate used by the service is quite weak: It is using the SHA-1 algorithm, that is deprecated [3, 4] , with a 2048-bit key. Finally, the service certificate is self-signed, and has expired. It was signed in August 2015, which suggest the service has been probably first online around this time. The HTTP server used is Nginx 1.0.14, which is a legacy version as the latest one at the time of writing is 1.10. There are multiple CVEs affecting the server version, as shown at cvedetails.com [5] , notably CVE-2013-4547, CVE-2013-0337, CVE-2012-2089 and CVE-2012-1180. An additional serious security issue is that the server is allowing SSL v3, which is vulnerable to multiple attacks [6, 7] . Bitlaunder suffers from many of the previously described problems.
Transactions with the Service. At total of 61 transactions were carried out with Darklaunder. At the beginning, the transactions were processed correctly even if the time needed to get the money back was longer than expected, usually between 8 and 10 h. From the 29th test on, transactions took more than 20 h to withdraw. From the 45th, it took between one and seven days to get the withdraw (sometimes, due to multiple failures during the laundering process). Eleven transactions have also been made with Bitlaunder but no delays were encountered, probably because they were requested to be more evenly spaced on time. For both services, the fees taken have always been exactly as announced, but once Darklaunder returned the money twice (so we received double the money we sent!) and another time, the service returned slightly less: 10% of the total sum was missing. These errors suggest that, at some point, the algorithm in charge of withdrawing the money was suffering from flaws. Another important mistake is that the service is using counters as transaction IDs, so the total number of transactions can be simply read. Furthermore, several issues with the laundering algorithm can be detected after analyzing our database of transactions. First and foremost, the independent accounts we have used happen to have common transactions. Also, when the service takes money from the wallet, the transaction used involves multiple input wallets and they have always exactly two outputs, one of them, as we will see later, being a central address. This is quite a poor practice since a malicious user may simply engage in making transactions on a regular basis to find the addresses of other users, thus partially de-anonymising the service (Fig. 1) . Tracking the Money. Using a script to trace the money, some common paths between the addresses used have emerged. In particular, we can detect a path between wallets and return addresses, showing the anonymity offered by the service is poor. Figure 2 shows the output of the program we developed to follow the money, where we can see the results when tracking the wallet generated in the first transaction with the service. The watch-list is made of the addresses given to the service to get the money back. We can see that, in this case, the money has been redistributed to three known addresses generated in the next tests (these three addresses are the only ones that belong to us within four levels of tracking for all the tests, however, with a deeper tracking it is possible to find even more).
Drawing and Analysing the Transactions. We will begin the analysis of the service by using Fig. 3 , which is the graph generated after analysing the transactions we performed with Darklaunder and Bitlaunder, to one level of depth.
The image allows to quickly visualise the very high centralization of the service, which is a poor characteristic regarding anonymity. All the wallets are th October 2015 -which matches nicely with our estimate of the creation time of the service -and has been continuously used since. Figure 4 shows the number of operations of the 15u...FKF address since its creation. The address has a total of 1,635 operations. The number of credit transactions (934) is roughly equal to the number of debit transactions (719). However, this address received money from 4,277 addresses but sent money to only 1,327 addresses. The total in and out by day from the creation of the address to the 26th February 2017 tends to confirm the hypothesis that the address has only be used as a gateway. We can observe that the credit and debit per day are approximately equal, leaving the address with only a few bitcoin in reserve. Our last 2016 test transaction with the service was on the 5 th May 2016, and at this time the wallet 7 was still using the same central address. However, another transaction has been carried out on the 27 June, and we can see that the wallet 8 has used another address to get back the money: 13K...isR 9 . This address has been created on the 15 June 2016, which matches with the moment when 15u...FKF's traffic started to decrease. In just 10 days, the new address made 110 transactions, sent 187.812357 BTC and received 190.612357 BTC.
By analysing money in, out and the total credit by day of address 13K...isR, we can see a very similar behaviour to that shown in Fig. 5 . We can also observe that the percentages of credit and debit transactions are similar for the two addresses. Considering these elements, we can guess that the service periodically switches its central address. This is a good security practice, but by itself not sufficient to provide enough anonymity. The characteristics we underlined above may allow to easily detect these new addresses, thus completely defeating its security aims. The interactions involving the central address follow recognisable patterns, as sho wninFig.6. We can see that in each case wallets send bitcoins to the central address (label 1) but sometimes they also send to another addresses (labels 2 and 3). These secondary addresses will receive bitcoins from other transactions involving the withdraw addresses, and will then send it to other addresses and back to the central node. Sometimes the rest of the transaction is directly sent to the central address, as with node 26. Node 6 on the graph represents the address 15v...j2N
10 . Looking at its transactions is particularly interesting: there are a total of 51 at the time of writing, and the pattern followed is very characteristic. The address receives money and then sends it to two types of addresses; most of the bitcoins go to the central node, but a few of them go to another address (not the same every time) which is probably there to confuse a potential attacker.
The fact that the money of all wallets is sent to the central node is a terrible weakness, since it allows to find the wallet addresses with great ease. In addition, performing most of the withdrawal transactions within only one or two levels of the central node is also extremely poor. When observing the withdrawal transactions, a specific pattern is also interesting to notice: almost every withdrawal is at a distance of one address, as we can see on Fig. 7 which has been adapted from real data. Address 1 (that has not been analysed) establishes a link between two withdrawals, and Address 2 send the funds to the addresses used to withdraw. Using Walletexplorer, we can find that Address 2 belongs to localBitcoins.com while Address 1 behaves similarly to Addresses 3 and 4. We can see that the debit transactions follow two distinct patterns. Either the central address gives money to localBitcoins, or it makes a peeling-chain (which consist in dividing the sums again and again) and eventually sends money to localBitcoins after a small number of transactions. Using the information gathered so far, we are now able to understand the complete workflow of the service, that we display in Fig. 8 . The wallets are used to credit the central address (1) but at the same time they can also make use of a change address (7). This change address will receive credit at the end of the withdraw chain and send it to the central address. The central address sends Bitcoins to localBitcoins directly but also, sometimes, starts a peeling chain where bitcoins can be sent to localBitcoins.com during the process (49, 51) or later (55, 56, 57, 58). Then, localBitcoins sends back money to the service (17, 28) which starts a new withdraw chain. Using the Chainalysis tool, a graph of the exchanges has been drawn (Fig. 9) . So we can conclude that the laundering algorithm itself is quite poor. The service is characterised by a heavy centralization because a central address is gathering all the Bitcoins from the customer's wallets and receives the rest of the money at the end of the withdraw chain. Furthermore, it is easy to find a direct route (only a few levels deep) from the central address to some of the wallets. Tracking is further facilitated because a significant number of transactions have multiple input addresses. Finally, the scarcity of traffic makes for an even easier address identification (Fig. 10) . 
Helix
The Service. Helix is accessible only using Tor 11 and offers two different services: a standard version and a light version. The two versions only differ in that the light one allows to withdraw to up to five addresses, and to choose to receive multiple transactions and/or within a random time delay of a few hours while the standard version requires registration and allows to manage a wallet and to automatically mix money send to the wallet to a defined address. Both standard and light services are taking 2.5% off fees, and only allow withdrawals of 0.02 B T Co rm o r e .
Analysis of the Transactions.
A total of 34 transactions were carried out with this service. The money always returned on time, and to the right number of addresses. On the more negative side, the page which displays the status of the laundering process has been observed to remain active a few days after the mixing has finished, when it is claimed to be available only for 24 h. Furthermore, a major problem has been found in the pattern of transactions: Regardless of whether we ask for multiple transactions or to use multiple addresses, our tests suggests that there will always be 5 transactions done in total. Some of our wallets and return addresses (issued from different tests) have also been observed taking part in the same transactions. Finally, our tests revealed that it always takes between one and two minutes to make a transaction. The average time is ninety seconds and the average duration for all the transactions to perform is five minutes and fifty seconds. This allows for a trivial timing-based attack.
Analysis of the Addresses. Our analysis has started by drawing a graph of the exchanges we carried out, at a depth level of 2 from our wallet and return addresses, as shown in Fig. 11 .
First, it is possible to observe that the green addresses (which are the addresses where the coins have been returned) are very close to each other. Sometimes even present in the same transaction. This can be explained by the fact that the service is using a peeling chain to fund its customers. An interesting fact is that the transactions in these chains have always a single input but can have between two and five outputs, thus allowing withdrawals to multiple customers at the same time. Three addresses involved in a big amount of transactions are shown in the graph. The one in the center is identified by Chainalysis's tool as part of LocalBitcoins.com. This cluster receives money from multiple points in peeling chains; This suggests it is widely used by customers of the service. The two other addresses are identified by the tool as part of the same cluster, which will be named C1
12 and studied later. Finally, the graph shows that multiple addresses are receiving coins from multiple wallet addresses (in red). Figure 12 has been drawn using Reactor. It represents the return transactions made by Helix. The point on the left is a custom cluster, made of all the return addresses used to perform the tests. The red point on the right is the Helix cluster, and the big point in the middle is cluster C1. It is possible to observe that C1 is receiving multiple transactions originated from an important number of addresses in the graph. This cluster seems to be receiving only coins from the Helix's peeling chains. The money sent by C1 can not be linked to Helix, but it is possible to formulate two hypothesis: Either the owner of the service is using the cluster to recover some money, or this is a very special customer making an extensive usage of the service (190 BTC have been received).
The second interesting point is that (even though not all the chains are shown in the graph) all the money that have been sent to the return addresses goes through the Helix cluster, after a few transactions on the peeling chain. This allows to guess the algorithm used by the service: it generates multiple wallets and recovers their money using a few transactions. This money is then directly sent to a peeling chain for the customers withdrawal.
Assessment of the Service. The Chainalysis's tool suggests that at least 216,000 BTC have been mixed using this service until early 2017 showing it is widely 13 used. However, our findings indicate that it does not offer adequate anonymity. We observed that wallets and withdrawals of multiple customers are present on the same transaction, or very close to each other, so that it is easy to identify them. For example, by processing regular and small-amount transactions with the service we can gain valuable insights that can help us compromise its security and anonymity at a very low cost.
Alphabay
The Service. Alphabay was accessible only through Tor 14 and required to open a customer account to use it. The registration was straightforward, and only a username and password were required. A wallet address is automatically generated by the service for the user, and that address changes every time a deposit is made. However, the address was still usable seven days after the change. On top of that, if the generated address is not used after ten days, it will be deleted. Each deposit to the service must be at least of 0.01 BTC, and it is possible to withdraw money for a fee of 0.001 BTC. The service offered the possibility to withdraw to one to five addresses, in an interval of time between one and twenty-four hours. An option labeled Sent a single transaction suggest that the service was capable of returning money in multiple transactions.
Transaction Analysis. We performed 35 transactions with the service before proceeding with a first analysis of the tumbler. Multiple problems were detected as this early point. First, the service was taking more than what was claimed in fees (0.007 BTC instead of 0.001). In addition, the money was moved from the user's wallet before the withdrawal was carried out. During the tests, we also noticed that the service was never returning the money in multiple transactions (a feature that is proposed in the form) and that it did not returned money to multiple addresses if the sum to withdraw is less than (#Addresses ·0.01 BTC). During our tests, we also notice that the service never returned money by doing multiple transactions to a single address. This was still true as of our last test on the 16th February, 2017. Another important problem was in the history of withdrawals, as IDs are used and they are simply incremental counters that leak the number of transactions. Using this information we can, for example, estimate the number of transactions to be around 33.76 per minute between the 4 and the 6 August 2016. Recent cluster size estimation tends to suggest the number of transactions did not changed a lot a year later. Finally, we can also detect some specific patterns concerning the number of input and outputs in the transactions performed by Alphabay, which can allow for simple heuristics to recognize them. On a more positive note, the money is always returned on time.
Analysis of the Addresses. By drawing the exchanges of the addresses on two depth levels, we can observe that while the money on the wallet addresses is going to addresses with a lot of traffic, the withdrawals are performed within a basic peeling chain. The peeling chain is a pattern of use widely present in the Bitcoin network; for example, various services often use it to withdraw their customers. Basically, the chains starts with an address receiving a decent amount of coins. This address will then send the coins to two (or more) addresses. One of these addresses will belong to the service and will then send coins to two (or more) addresses until there is no money left. In our example (Fig. 13) , we can see a withdraw chain started by the service (in blue) with 50 BTC. Another common characteristic is that the nodes of a peeling chains have only two transactions. One credit and one debit. In the case that a peeling chain is used by a service, it can happen that the orange nodes are not to withdraw to a customer but just a redirection of some part of the money to another peeling chain also owned by the service. For example, 1dj6nAA7Sp456Ph9EvM8LYnvb6aYX9NPQ is the start of a classical peeling chain. If we look closely at Fig. 14 , the first thing we will notice is that three addresses on the graph are involved in a lot of transactions. These addresses will be discussed later and will be named A1
15 (the one on the left), A2 16 (the one at the bottom) and A3
17 (the one on the upper right). We will first focus on the exchanges carried out by our wallets: We can observe that, every time, the service is making transactions with the wallet following the exact same pattern. Money is moved with a transaction having only one input and one output, and goes to an address which has multiple transactions. We can observe a lot of transactions on this destination address, so we used Chainalysis's tools to gather more information.
There are multiple types of clusters we can observe in Fig. 15: 1. Some are identified by Chainalysis as belonging to well-known services, such as BTC-e or localBitcoins.com 2. Some are not identified as known services, and only receive money from addresses identified as part of the Alphabay cluster, or from addresses matching the wallet pattern. Then, they send money to an unique service using different addresses (for example 19Gc...X1d 18 ). In this case, we hypothesize that Alphabay is using these services to mix the bitcoins. 3. Some are matching pattern 2, but do not send money directly to services and instead start peeling chains (e.g.: 1JJww8DFoAp5whSu4oV 89yZyY8MPVomsiz). The peeling chain is probably used to withdraw money off the service. 4. Some are matching the pattern 2, but sending money directly to multiple services. We do not have a good enough explanation for these cases. 5. A few clusters are sending and receiving money to/from multiple services.
In this case, they probably belong to services that are not detected by the tool yet.
What we can tentatively conclude from this study is that Alphabay is using other third party services to mix their bitcoins, but that it probably also makes some custom in-house mixing. Here, we can identify a clear flaw: multiple customer wallets are sending money to the same address, which could make the detection of wallet addresses and the tainting process particularly easy. When studying addresses A1, A2 and A3 in Fig. 15 , we observe that these are receiving a total of 8,582 credit transactions and only 122 debit transactions. Moreover, the credit transactions have (with a few exceptions) only one input and one output. This suggests we are dealing with users' wallets. We noticed that the clusters have a relatively large number of transactions matching the same pattern: Deposit transactions having one (or two in some cases) inputs and two outputs. We then analyzed return addresses. We can see in Fig. 15 that these addresses are often linked together and, sometimes, have associations to addresses exchanging with many more addresses than usual. In the first case, we observed that the addresses are part of a peeling chain. These peeling chains are most of the time tainted with Alphabay addresses, but sometimes we can track-back their origin to services such as localBitcoins. The second case is a direct withdraw from a known service (most of the time, localBitcoins). Our address is never alone on the outputs, and most of the time another output in the withdraw transaction leads to Alphabay. On both cases, we can say that the withdraw is not secure. On the first case, since the peeling chain is highly tainted by Alphabay, it would be easy to identify withdraw chains tainted by the service. Even without knowing which cluster Alphabay is, engaging in regular, low-cost transactions with it should be enough for taint purposes. In the second case, we would need to know Alphabay's addresses to be able to find the withdraw addresses. This would be a little more involved but not too difficult. In any case, this is not the most common way the money is withdrew.
Conclusions
Bitcoin mixers are quite popular nowadays, but even the most well-known and established ones seem to have serious security and privacy limitations, as exposed in this work. Together with the major players, a myriad of smaller laundry services such as Bitlaunder, Darklaunder and Coinmixer exist, and we have shown some of them offer an appalling service that can seriously compromise the security and privacy expectations of any legitimate user. Unfortunately also the major players such as Alphabay and Helix present significant deficiencies. Our findings show that devising and implementing a secure mixer is far from an easy task, and as such it is plagued with a multitude of opportunities to get things wrong and compromise the service. This is refreshing news for Law Enforcement, who will be able to taint Bitcoin transactions and even back-track them by using our findings and some readily available technology. But at the same time this is worrying news to any legitimate Bitcoin user that simply wants to use these services for the purpose of increasing its anonymity. More study needs to be done on the advantages and shortcomings of the different algorithms employed by these tumblers, as a well-founded theoretical analysis of a highly secure and privacy-aware protocol for providing the required mixing services is unfortunately still lacking. Whether these mix services will continue to be popular and profitable in the near future, when alternative cryptocurrencies that offer improved anonymity and untraceability properties such as Monero or Zcash become widely accepted, is still an open question.
